NEW YORK – While Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani mulled in March last year to force out President Asif Ali Zardari, his choice for the country’s head of state was ANP chief Asfandyar Wali Khan and not PML-N Quaid Nawaz Sharif, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.
On his part, Zardari made preparations for a coup or assassination, and even instructed his son Bilawal, the Chairman of Pakistan PeopleÂ’s Party, to name his sister, Faryal Talpur, as president, in case of his ouster.
The tensions between the President Zardari and Gen Kayani came out as Kayani is quoted as telling US Ambassador Anne Patterson during a March 2009 meeting that he “might however reluctantly” pressure Zardari to resign.
Zardari feared for his position and possibly his life: the cables reveal that US Vice President Joseph Biden told Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain in March 2009 that Zardari had told him that the “ISI Director General and Kayani will take me out,” the New York Times said, citing the cables.
Gen Kayani made it clear regardless how much he disliked Zardari he distrusted Nawaz (Sharif) even more,” the ambassador wrote.
By 2010, after many sessions with Zardari, Ms Patterson had revised the guarded optimism that characterised her early cables about Zardari.
“Pakistan’s civilian Government remains weak, ineffectual and corrupt,” she wrote on Feb 22, 2010, the eve of a visit by the FBI Director, Robert Mueller. “Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about the fate of President Zardari.”
That assessment holds more than eight months later, even as President Barack Obama in October extended an invitation to Zardari to visit the White House next year, the Times said.
In US view, Zardari is sympathetic to American goals – stiff sanctions on terrorist financing, the closing down of terrorist training camps – but lacks the power to fulfil his promises against resistance from the military and intelligence agencies.
But the Times, cited the cables, depict General Kayani as a stubborn guarantor of what he sees as Pakistan ‘s national interest, “an army chief who meddles in civilian politics but stops short of overturning the elected order.”
Early in the Obama administration, General Kayani made clear a condition for improved relations. As DG ISI, from 2004 to 2007, he did not want a “reckoning with the past,” said a cable in 2009 introducing him to the new administration.
“Kayani will want to hear that the United States has turned the page on past ISI operations,” it said. General Kayani was probably referring to the peace accords with the Taliban from 2004 to 2007 that resulted in the strengthening of the militants.
If the General seems confidently in charge, the cables portray Zardari as a man not fully aware of his weakness.
At one point Zardari said he would not object if Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered in Pakistan as the father of its nuclear weapons programme, were interviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency but tacitly acknowledged that he was powerless to make that happen.
Written from the American Embassy in Islamabad, the cables also reveal American manoeuvring as diplomats try to support an unpopular elected Government that is more sympathetic to American aims than is the real power in Pakistan, the Army and intelligence agency so crucial to the fight against militants.
Frustration at American inability to persuade the Pakistani Army and intelligence agency to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban and other militants runs through the reports of meetings between American and Pakistani officials, the Times said.
That frustration preoccupied the Bush administration and became an issue for the incoming Obama administration, according to the cables document, during a trip in January 2009 that VP Biden made to Pakistan 11 days before he was sworn in.
“The United States needs to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan’s part of the bargain,” Biden said, according to a Feb 6, 2009, cable.
General Kayani tried to reassure him, saying, “We are on the same page in Afghanistan, but there might be different tactics.” Biden replied that “results” would test that.
The cables reveal at least one example of increased cooperation, previously undisclosed, under the Obama administration. Last fall, the Pakistani Army secretly allowed 12 American Special Operations soldiers to deploy with Pakistani troops in the violent tribal areas near the Afghan border.
The Americans were forbidden to conduct combat missions, the Times said. Even though their numbers were small, their presence at army headquarters in Bajaur, South Waziristan and North Waziristan was a “sea change in thinking,” the embassy reported.
The embassy added its usual caution: The deployments must be kept secret or the “Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
Within the past year, however, Pakistan and the United States have gingerly started to publicly acknowledge the role of American field advisers. Lt Col Michael Shavers, an American military spokesman in Islamabad, said in a statement that “at the request of the Pakistanis,” small teams of Special Operations forces “move to various locations with their Pakistani military counterparts throughout Pakistan.”
Moreover, last week in a report to Congress on operations in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said that the Pakistani Army had also accepted American and coalition advisers in Quetta.
Meanwhile, The Washington Post quoted a senior Pakistani diplomat as saying that the leaks would hurt ties between Islamabad and other nations.
“You have built them over the years and all of a sudden something gets out – itÂ’s top secret, itÂ’s classified, it harms the relationship,” Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan ‘s Ambassador to Britain, told the BBC.
The US Ambassador to Pakistan has already expressed his regret over the leaks.
The US and Western officials have expressed concerns over Pakistan ‘s nuclear arsenal, given the threat posed by Al-Qaida and Taliban militants, but in public have generally said they believed it was safe.
In a Feb 4, 2009, document, Patterson wrote that “our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP (Government of Pakistan) facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.”
The Guardian reported that Russian and British officials shared the same concern.
Pakistan has repeatedly said its nuclear assets are safe.
The papers reported that in 2007 Pakistan had agreed “in principle” to an operation to remove highly enriched uranium from a Pakistani nuclear reactor, but it was never carried because of the domestic opposition. Pakistan said Monday it refused the operation because its own nuclear security would prevent the material from getting into the wrong hands.
The US National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, Peter Lavoy, told NATO representatives in November 2008 that despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world.
The memos also provide insight into American views on PakistanÂ’s efforts to fight extremists.
The United States is pushing Pakistan to take action against insurgents in the northwest who are behind attacks in Afghanistan. But Islamabad has resisted because it views the groups as potential assets against the influence of archenemy India in Afghanistan, once the Americans withdraw.
In one memo, Patterson said she was sceptical that Pakistan would abandon the militants. “There is no chance … for abandoning support for these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India,” she wrote.
KASWAR KLASRA from Islamabad adds: President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai not only admitted sheltering as many as 200 Pak-national Balochs (involved in acts of terrorism in Balochistan) but also said that he was repentant over not helping Bugti when the latter had called him for help, a disclosure by WikiLeaks that could spark deep tensions between the two neighbouring countries.
In addition to giving refuge to Baloch nationals in his country, it was also revealed that Karzai also told a senior US official that Baloch leader Bugti had once tried to call him but he had refused to help him for the sake of good relations with Pakistan and now he (Karzai) could not forgive himself for refusing him.
According to the same classified American diplomatic documents, Karzai told higher officials of Obama administration that India was not helping Pak-national Balochs and rather it was Afghan government, which was giving them refuge. However, Karzai takes the conversation off the record when it comes to the fate of Baloch leader Brahamdagh Bugti, documents leaked by ‘ WikiLeaks’ stated.
It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan has long been asking the Karzai government to hand over wanted Baloch terrorism suspects living in Afghanistan, however Karzai denied having knowledge of all of them.
However, US diplomatic cables, currently exposed by the ‘ WikiLeaks’ not only confirm Karzai’s admitting of giving refuge to Balochs but also reveal that he had also told visiting senior US officials that he asked Balochs to seek asylum in the US.
Pakistan has long been claiming that the men have taken refuge in Afghanistan and are using the country as a base to launch terrorist attacks in Balochistan.
According to Wikileaks, Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Karzai if he knew where Bugti was. Karzai responded that a lot of Bugtis come to Afghanistan.
“Fomenting uprising does not make one a terrorist. The real terrorists were Bin Laden and Mullah Omar,” Karzai told Boucher.
Shockingly, Karzai accused Pakistan of supporting terrorists and asked Boucher to use his influence over Pakistan to stop supporting terrorists.
“Afghanistan needs a sign that Pakistan will stop supporting these terrorists,” Karzai said.
Boucher asked Karzai which side should move first and queried whether Afghanistan could take the grandson (of Bugti) into custody or strike some political deal? Karzai explained that the Bugtis would blame the United States if Afghanistan turned them in, US cables stated.
Karzai, during the same meeting told Boucher that both Bugti and India were not involved in causing unrest in Pakistan.
“Yes, Bugti and India are not involved in promoting terrorism in Pakistan,” Karzai told Boucher when asked if he could assure Pakistan that the Bugtis were not supporting armed struggle and that India was not involved.
Karzai further said that he knew Bugti, who was highly respected in the US.
Agencies add: According to the memos, during a meeting with the US Ambassador, President Zardari outlined PakistanÂ’s need for additional assistance, a message that would figure prominently in his meeting with Special Representative Richard Holbrooke.
Zardari outlined the steps he would follow to restrict Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and reported that the Supreme Court would likely to declare Nawaz Sharif ineligible to run for the National Assembly.
Zardari claimed Nawaz had planned to run AQ Khan on a Pakistan Muslim League-N slate, so it was better to confront Nawaz sooner rather than later. Zardari said he had been ready to make a deal with Shahbaz Sharif that would provide for a constitutional amendment to increase the retirement age for the justices – presumably bringing back the former chief justice as a justice – but Shahbaz had been uncooperative. Zardari said he was convinced that Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani would never support Nawaz Sharif as prime minister.
In January 2010, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan told US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that Zardari had asked him to convey a request to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa that ZardariÂ’s family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his death.
Zardari is frank about the strength of the Taliban. “I’m sorry to say this but we are not winning” the war against extremists, he told US Vice-President Joe Biden in 2009, one of the leaked US cables state.
“I am not Benazir, and I know it,” he told US Ambassador Anne Patterson after his wife’s death.
The released documents indicate that PakistanÂ’s political leadership has allegedly been in agreement with US drone attacks. The cables quote former US Ambassador Patterson as saying that the countryÂ’s political leadership approved the strikes in PakistanÂ’s tribal regions.
Patterson’s cable states: Malik suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur operation. The PM brushed aside Rehman’s remarks and said, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”
Although publicly Pakistani officials oppose the attacks, this particular cable shows they allegedly back them in private.
The embassy cables also revealed that small teams of US special forces soldiers were allegedly secretly embedded with PakistanÂ’s military forces in the tribal regions, helping to hunt down Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters and co-ordinate drone strikes in the area.
“The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of US special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX (location blocked), occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces,” one of the cables’ summary stated.
General Ashfaq Kayani told the US ambassador during a March 2009 meeting that he “might, however reluctantly,” pressure Zardari to resign, according to a cable cited by the Times.
Kayani was quoted as saying that he might support Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National League Party, as the new president – not ZardariÂ’s arch-nemesis Nawaz Sharif.
The cables also touch on allegations of extra-judicial killings by Pakistani forces, according to the Times.
A cable last year suggested there was credible evidence that the Pakistani army or paramilitary forces killed some detainees after an offensive against Taliban insurgents in lawless northwestern regions.
The embassy said that news of killings should not be leaked to the press, for fear of offending the Pakistani Army. However, this year the United States said it would cut off support for some Pakistani units following the release of a video that appeared to show extra-judicial killings.
In a May 2008 meeting with a visiting American Congressional delegation, Zardari reportedly said: “We won’t act without consulting with you.”
Sharif repeatedly told the US Ambassador that he was “pro-American”, despite his often critical public stance. He thanked the US for “arranging” to have Kayani appointed as army chief.
“The best thing America has done recently,” he said.
“The fact that a former prime minister believes the US could control the appointment of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence here,” the Ambassador noted afterwards.
After General Pervez Musharraf resigned as president in 2008, Ambassador Patterson pressed Zardari to grant him immunity from prosecution.
“We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country,” she said.
The US and Kayani worried that Zardari would renege on his word.
“Zardari is walking tall these days, hopefully not too tall to forget his promise to Kayani and to us on an immunity deal,” wrote Patterson. If Zardari didn’t protect Musharraf then it would make him look bad.
“I have to bring the Army along with me,” he said, also noting that the delay “does nothing for Zardari’s reputation for trustworthiness”.
President Zardari alleged that the brother of Nawaz Sharif, “tipped off” Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) about impending UN sanctions following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, allowing the outfit to empty its bank accounts before they could be raided.
Six weeks after LeT gunmen killed more than 170 people in Mumbai, Zardari told the US of his “frustration” that Sharif’s Government in Punjab helped the group evade new UN sanctions.
A month earlier, Shahbaz Sharif, who is chief minister of Punjab, “tipped off” Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), LeT’s charity wing, “resulting in almost empty bank accounts”, Zardari claimed in a conversation with Patterson.
US diplomats were unable to confirm the allegation and noted that they came at a time of rising political tension between Zardari and Sharif.
But they conceded that JuD did appear to have received a warning from somewhere.
“Information from the Ministry of the Interior does indicate that bank accounts contained surprisingly small amounts,” said the cable in January 2009.
A Punjab Government spokesman vigorously denied the charge. “There’s nothing true in it,” said senator Pervaiz Rashid, an adviser to Sharif.
“Zardari is our political opponent and he wants to topple our Government.”
Pakistan’s generals, usually antagonistic towards India, appeared unusually conciliatory. Six weeks after the Mumbai attack Pakistan’s army chief said he was “determined to exercise restraint in his actions with India”.
Earlier in the year, he reminded Patterson, information about a second attack on India had “come his way”, which he conveyed to Delhi via the CIA.
In a January 20, 2009 meeting with US CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani reiterated his need for support and asked for changes in the Coalition Support Fund process to allow for more rapid reimbursement.
Kayani spoke candidly about the process of reimbursement of CSF. He said it was important to avoid the impression that the Pakistan military is “for hire.” Still, the military had little incentive to provide the copious documentation, since only 40 percent of the money had been returned to military coffers in the past. Kayani said the money had mostly supported the Federal Government’s budget. The typical breakdown had been about 60 percent to the Federal Government, 40 percent to the military, but President Zardari had told him recently that the entire amount would be reimbursed to the military. Kayani suggested that the CSF reimbursement amount “mirror” the system used for the UN’s reimbursement of peacekeeping expenses or establish a base period and estimate the increase in military activity from that base. Petraeus indicated that he believed that the prospects for the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act” also known as the Biden-Lugar legislation, which would provide $1.5 billion for development activities, were positive, and there were plans underway to fund Pakistan’s military needs.
In opening remarks regarding General KayaniÂ’s likely move into the official COAS residence, Kayani observed that former president MusharrafÂ’s situation seemed to be fine, even though he had been concerned earlier about ZardariÂ’s failure to grant amnesty to Musharraf. Kayani observed that amnesty should have been granted immediately when Zardari assumed office, but it seemed as if the situation had settled down and he was no longer as concerned about president MusharrafÂ’s legal situation.
Petraeus said the most important threat to Pakistan was on the western border and internally. Terrorists were an existential threat to Pakistan. Kayani agreed. However, Kayani observed that he had postponed a missile test. The Indians, he said, in contrast, had conducted one just a few hours before. Kayani said he had no intention to resume missile testing as long as the current tensions persisted. He promised to be transparent with allies about his plans and had briefed Petraeus about his move of 6,000 troops to the Indian border. Kayani said he was determined to exercise restraint in his actions with India. He recounted that he had taken no action the evening that Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had supposedly called President Zardari and threatened to declare war.
The leaked memos exposed deep tensions between the United States and Pakistan on nuclear arms safety. The Guardian said the cables cited serious concerns from the British.
They also quoted the Russians as saying: “There are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in PakistanÂ’s nuclear and missile programmes… There is no way to guarantee that all are 100 percent loyal and reliable.”
Embassy cables show US diplomats were non-plussed over neuroscientistÂ’s whereabouts before she surfaced in Afghanistan.
Contrary to claims by supporters of Aafia Siddiqui, the Pakistani neuroscientist was never imprisoned at the Bagram military prison in Afghanistan, the embassy cables suggest.
“Bagram officials have assured us that they have not been holding Siddiqui for the last four years, as has been alleged,” the embassy wrote on July 31, 2008.
Though the US denials of SiddiquiÂ’s account have generally been treated with scepticism by the Pakistani media, which has given credence to the familyÂ’s account and dismissed US statements as part of a cover-up.
But the cables suggest American officials felt they genuinely had nothing to hide about Siddiqui and her three missing children, two of whom resurfaced in Karachi.
After Siddiqui was convicted last February, ambassador Anne Patterson said that Pakistani reaction was driven by “one-sided” media coverage that caused Pakistanis “to conclude her acquittal was a near certainty”.
According to the leaks, in January 2010 a US congressional delegation led by Representative Stephen Lynch met with Imran Khan. He urged the US to seek out “alternative points of views” to get an accurate assessment of the real terrorist threat in Pakistan. He called on the US to engage local tribes to deal with the Taliban and other militant forces, and argued that the US will have to scale back its operations in Afghanistan in order to make way for talks. He denounced the use of aerial bombings and drone operations, arguing that they have created animosity and caused local tribesmen to join militant forces.
In January 2009 Abdullah told James Jones, then the US national security adviser, that Pakistan’s army was “staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to US wishes, rather than doing what it ‘should’”.
Abdullah’s preference for military rule was recorded by the Saudis’ American guests: “They appear to be looking for ‘another Musharraf’: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust.” His views were echoed by the interior minister, who said Saudi Arabia viewed the army as its “winning horse” in Pakistan.
The anti-Zardari bias appears to have a sectarian tinge. Pakistan’s ambassador to Riyadh, Umar Khan Alisherzai, says the Saudis, who are Sunni, distrust Zardari, a Shia. Last year the United Arab Emirates’ foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, told Hillary Clinton that Saudi suspicions of Zardari’s Shia background were “creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari”.
In early 2008 the Saudi foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, described Sharif as a “force for stability” and “a man who can speak across party lines even to religious extremists”. American officials noted that Sharif had obtained preferential business deals during his time in Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile the Saudis have pressured Zardari with oil and money. In late 2008 Pakistani officials complained that “not a drop” of Saudi oil promised at concessionary rates had been delivered, while the annual aid cheque of $300m was well below the regular rate.
Zardari has asserted his independence from the Saudis. The king was unhappy that he made his first official visit to China and skipped the opening of a new university in favour of meetings in Europe and the US.
US diplomats see the Saudis as allies but also competitors for influence in Pakistan.
In Islamabad, American diplomats have sought to diminish Saudi influence by allying with another Muslim country, Turkey. After a meeting with the Turkish Ambassador in May 2009, Ambassador Anne Patterson noted that moderate, progressive Turkey presented a “positive role model” for Pakistan.
It was well positioned, she said, to “neutralise somewhat the more negative influence on Pakistan politics and society exercised by Saudi Arabia”.
JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman hosted a dinner in honour of US Ambassador Anne W Patterson in 2007 and sought American support for his ambition to become a prime minister.
Another embassy cable said that ISI chief Lt-Gen Shuja Pasha is more emotional than Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani.
Once President Zardari asked Anne Patterson to calm the worsening relationship between Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif.
Another cable quoted Anne Patterson as saying that the release of nuclear scientist AQ Khan appeared to be a tactic of Interior Minister Rehman Malik.
Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and ambassador Robert Brinkley urged Pakistan to send the ISI chief to India (a proposal that later backfired).
US embassy cables said India ‘unlikely’ to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan after Mumbai attacks. “The US ambassador to India examines the country’s so-called Cold Start strategy, a plan to attack Pakistan, which he describes as a ‘mixture of myth and reality’. He says it is unlikely that India would implement the strategy, and questionable whether it would succeed if it did.”
Reuters adds: The chief of PakistanÂ’s spy agency said he had contacted Israeli officials to head off potential attacks on Israeli targets in India, according to an October 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks.
Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, told former U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson that he wanted Washington to know he had been to Oman and Iran “to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India”.
“Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India,” the Oct 7, 2009 cable reported.
An ISI spokesman had no immediate comment.
Pakistan, a conservative Muslim country, has no diplomatic relations with Israel. Such contacts would infuriate Muslim militants waging a campaign to topple the government.