A concerted effort to start unprecedented talks between Taliban and British and American envoys was outlined yesterday in a significant change in tactics designed to bring about a breakthrough in the attritional, eight-year conflict in Afghanistan.
Senior ministers and commanders on the ground believe they have created the right conditions to open up a dialogue with “second-tier” local leaders now the Taliban have been forced back in a swath of Helmand province.
They are hoping that Britain’s continuing military presence in Helmand, strengthened by the arrival of thousands of US troops, will encourage Taliban commanders to end the insurgency. There is even talk in London and Washington of a military “exit strategy”.
Speaking at the end of the five-week Operation Panther’s Claw in which hundreds of British troops were reported to have cleared insurgents from a vital region of Helmand province, Lieutenant-General Simon Mayall, deputy chief of defence staff, said: “It gives the Taliban ‘second tier’ room to reconnect with the government and this is absolutely at the heart of this operation.”
The second tier of the insurgency are regarded as crucial because they control large numbers of Taliban fighters in Pashtun-dominated southern Afghanistan. The first tier of Taliban commanders – hardliners around Mullah Omar – could not be expected to start talks in the foreseeable future. The third tier – footsoldiers with no strong commitments – are not regarded as influential or significant players.
The change in tactics was revealed as the Ministry of Defence announced that two more British soldiers were killed in southern Afghanistan. One, from the Light Dragoons, was on patrol in Operation Panther’s Claw; the other, a soldier from the Royal Artillery, was killed on foot patrol in Sangin. Ten soldiers have died in Operation Panther’s Claw.
Mayall is responsible for formulating operational policy in Afghanistan and his remarks gave added weight to interventions by senior ministers yesterday.
David Miliband, the foreign secretary, and Douglas Alexander, the international development secretary, yesterday held out the prospect of reconciliation between the Afghan government and Taliban fighters prepared to renounce violence.
For more than a year, British intelligence officers have been instigating contacts with Taliban commanders and their entourage. But their task has been very delicate given the sensitivities of the Karzai administration in Kabul.
The situation has been complicated further by the influx of hardline and ideologically motivated fighters joining the Taliban and other insurgent groups from across the Pakistani border.
But the fact that senior ministers and military commanders seized on the apparent success of Operation Panther’s Claw to highlight the possibility of talks with the Taliban reflects their concern about the lack of progress so far in Nato’s counter-insurgency. Significantly, and as if to counter public aversion to talks with the Taliban, ministers and military commanders alike compared the current campaign in southern Afghanistan to anti-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland.
A ComRes poll in today’s Independent suggests most people now believe British troops should be pulled out of Afghanistan. Most of those who responded (58%) said the Taliban could not be defeated militarily, and 52% of those surveyed said troops should be withdrawn immediately. This compares with a Guardian/ICM poll earlier this month which showed that 42% of those surveyed wanted troops to be withdrawn immediately.
America’s priorities in Afghanistan will be spelled out in a briefing paper drawn up by General Stanley McChrystal, the new US commander in the country, due to be handed to Barack Obama tomorrow.
He will emphasise the need for speeding up the training of Afghan troops, according to defence sources. He is also expected to ask for more troops from Nato allies. British military commanders are drawing up contingency plans to increase the number of British forces to more than 10,000 from the current 9,000.
Asked whether he needed more troops, Brigadier Tim Radford, commander of British troops in Helmand, replied: “I have enough forces to do what I set out to do in Panther’s Claw.”
The number of British troops that might be deployed in future was “out of my hands”, he said. But he added that as the number of Afghan army recruits increased, the number of Nato forces required to train them also increased.
Miliband’s call for talks with more moderate Taliban elements was echoed later by Gordon Brown, who said: “Our strategy has always been to complement the military action that we’ve got to take to clear the Taliban, to threaten al-Qaida in its bases – while at the same time we put in more money to build the Afghan forces, the troops, the police.”
Memo to Clinton: US ain’t top dog
The US doesn’t necessarily lead the pack in world affairs – something Hillary Clinton should remember on her Asian tour
Speaking in Washington before embarking on this week’s Asian tour, Hillary Clinton set out the most definitive version yet of how the Obama administration intends to deal with the world. The US secretary of state spoke of “a new era of engagement based on common interests, shared values, and mutual respect” and of a foreign policy “blending principle and pragmatism”.
Contrasting this collaborative approach with the “for us or against us” stance of the Bush administration, Clinton said the US would opt for diplomacy first when dealing with Iran, North Korea and other nations or adversaries. There were no guarantees of success; and dialogue did not imply acceptance of repressive regimes. But “we cannot be afraid or unwilling to engage … as long as engagement might advance our interests”.
Clinton’s call for a “multi-partner” rather than a multi-polar world is the diplomatic equivalent of police brutality victim Rodney King’s famous (and unsuccessful) plea for mutual tolerance at the height of the 1992 Los Angeles race riots. “People, I just want to say, you know, can we all get along?” asked King. Clinton’s similar, less eloquent call for international amity and understanding may also have limited impact. Today North Korea’s hothead leadership lambasted her, saying she resembled “a pensioner going shopping“. So no breakthrough just yet.
More surprisingly perhaps, Clinton’s visits this week to India and Thailand, where she met leaders of south-east Asian nations and her Chinese, Russian, South Korean and Japanese counterparts, suggested to some that the US may struggle to maintain constructive partnerships with its allies, let alone its enemies. These tensions are only partly attributable to George Bush’s toxic legacy and resulting anti-Americanism. They have more to do with perceived changes in the global balance of power, principally a post-crash decline in US clout and a parallel expansion of Chinese and Indian influence.
In Delhi, Clinton was publicly slapped down over pre-Copenhagen pressure from Washington and others for binding caps on carbon emissions, with environment minister Jairam Ramesh complaining about mooted carbon tariffs on Indian exports. At the same time, she acquiesced in Bush’s nuclear technology deal with India, which drove a coach and horses through the international non-proliferation regime, and gave a green light to massive future US arms sales to India, hardly reassuring prospects for Pakistan.
Clinton also appears to have tip-toed around the issue of divided Kashmir, mindful perhaps of British foreign secretary David Miliband’s bruising experience in Delhi earlier this year. This is odd, given the high importance Washington attaches to its Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy and its wish that Pakistani troops, currently deployed along the Line of Control facing India, be redirected into the battle against the Taliban and Islamist militants. These and other strains are certain to resurface once the jolly bonhomie surrounding Clinton’s visit, more resembling a campaign trail meet-and-greet than a diplomatic summit, dissipates.
“Obama is committed to ratifying the comprehensive test ban treaty and strengthening the non-proliferation treaty [India is party to neither] … He also intends for the US to be part of the international effort to replace the Kyoto protocol with a treaty-based climate control regime including India, China and other emerging powers,” noted Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution thinktank in a recent article. Such fundamental differences do not bode well for the strengthened, strategic partnership with India that Clinton enthused about.
Clinton’s declaration in Thailand that the US was “back” in south-east Asia, and intended to give greater priority to its friends in the region, also elicited mixed responses. Her ever tougher line on North Korea, coupled with US pressure on Asean members to do more to confront the Burmese junta, makes many countries nervous.
This cage-rattling could yet prove counter-productive. Old ally Japan, for example, may be about to elect a party pledged to re-examine the role of the US military in the Asia-Pacific region. Others, such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, are increasingly drawn towards Beijing’s powerful economic orbit. For its part, China itself may no longer be a US enemy – but it remains unclear whether, on a range of international issues, it can really be classed as a friend. Mostly China suits itself. These days it can afford to.
Yet possibly the biggest obstacle to the “new mindset” partnerships Clinton envisaged in her Washington speech is of her own creation – her very old-fashioned assumption that, in all such arrangements, the US will naturally be top dog and pack leader. This is what Iranian conservatives term the “global arrogance”. Memo to HC: it ain’t necessarily so.